

# Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks on Unsupervised Contrastive Learning


Hao He<sup>1\*</sup>, Kaiwen Zha<sup>1\*</sup>, Dina Katabi<sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup>MIT CSAIL, \*Co-primary Authors






#### Motivation

 No existing indiscriminate poisoning methods can attack contrastive learning (CL).







Contrastive learning defense all prior works

# Method - Contrastive Poisoning

• Idea: providing the model a shortcut to minimize the CL loss without actually learning real features.





 Algorithm: co-optimize the poison perturbation and a neural network to minimize the CL loss.



#### • **Key 1:** Back-propagate through data augmentations.

• **Key 2:** Back-propagate through momentum encoder.





#### Results I: Effectiveness

 Contrastive poisoning works for different datasets and different contrastive learning algorithms.

Attack Type	SimCLR	CIFAR-10 MoCo v2	BYOL	SimCLR	CIFAR-100 MoCo v2	BYOL	ImageNet-100 SimCLR
None	91.8	91.8	92.2	63.6	65.2	65.3	69.3
RANDOM NOISE	90.4	90.1	90.7	58.5	59.8	61.0	67.5
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (S) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C)	<b>44.9</b> 68.0	<b>55.1</b> 61.9	59.6 <b>56.9</b>	<b>19.9</b> 34.7	<b>21.8</b> 41.9	41.9 <b>39.2</b>	<b>48.2</b> 55.6

 Contrastive poisoning works even if the attacker does not know the victim's downstream task.

Attack True	Poisoning on CIFAR-10			Poisoning on ImageNet-100		
Attack Type	CIFAR-10	CIFAR-100	STL-10	ImageNet-100	CIFAR-10	STL-10
None	91.8	47.2	78.2	69.3	72.5	82.0
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (S)	44.9	16.7	43.1	48.2	59.9	67.8
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C)	68.0	28.7	58.4	55.6	62.9	71.6

 Contrastive poisoning works even if the attacker does not know the victim's model architecture.

Attack Type	VGG-19	ResNet-18	ResNet-50	DenseNet-121	MobileNetV2
None	88.3	91.8	92.8	93.5	89.4
CP (S) CP (C)	35.1 65.5	44.9 68.0	49.1 71.6	48.4 69.6	42.6 61.6

### Results II: Transferability


Attack Type + Attacker's Alg.	Victim's Algorithm Supervised SimCLR		
ADVERSARIAL POISONING UNLEARNABLE EXAMPLES	8.7 19.9	81.5 91.3	
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (SIMCLR) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (MoCo) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (BYOL)	10.2 10.0 10.1	68.0 60.9 60.7	


One poison attacks supervised and contrastive learning


Attack Type + Attacker's Alg.	Victin	n's Algori	thm
	SimCLR	MoCo	BYOL
ADVERSARIAL POISONING UNLEARNABLE EXAMPLE	81.5	80.3	78.6
	91.3	90.9	91.6
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (S) (SIMCLR) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (S) (MoCo) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (S) (BYOL)	<b>44.9</b> 54.9 65.1	82.0 <b>55.1</b> 64.2	85.4 71.1 59.6
CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (SIMCLR) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (MoCo) CONTRASTIVE POISONING (C) (BYOL)	68.0	68.4	67.2
	60.9	61.9	59.5
	60.7	61.8	<b>56.9</b>

One poison attacks all different CL algorithms


### Results III: Visualization







- (a) noise attacks SL (b) noise attacks CL
- Contrastive poisoning is not linear separable.



 Contrastive poisoning has high frequency patterns.

Contrastive poisoning shortcuts alignment loss.

